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INTRODUCTION 
The Third medium term Community action Programme  for  Equal Opportunities 
between  women  and  men  (1991-1995)  (1)  which  was  the  subject  of  the 
Council  Resolution of 21  May  1991  (2)  provides that the Commission shall 
"adopt  a  Memorandum to define the  scope  and  concept of equal pay  for 
work  of equai value and  p~ovide guidance  on the criteria to be  takeh 
into  account in  job evaluation and  job  classification". 
The  adoption  of  a  Memorandum  was  recommended  as  one  of  the  main 
conclusions  arising  out  of  the  Forum  on  Equal  Pay  Legislation  in  the 
Member  States  organised by  the Women's  Rights  Committee  of the  European 
Parliament  in March  1992. 
The  necessity  and utility of  such  a  document  was  emphasised  during  the 
Equal  Pay Seminar organised by the Belgian Presidency which took place on 
25  and  26  October 1993. 
This  Memorandum  is  offered  for  information  and  consideration  to 
interested parties  concerned  with  or  involved  in  the  equal  pay  issue, 
such as appropriate government departments,  national agencies having the 
reponsibility  to  address  disputes,  social  partners, 
consultants.  It does  not  contain  formal  proposals  as  such. 
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PART  X  BACKGROUND 
The  principle  of  equal  pay  for  men  and  women  has  been  enshrined  in 
Community  law  from  its  origins.  Article  119  of  the  EC  Treaty  requires 
Member States to "ensure and subsequently maintain the application of the 
principle that men  and  women  should  receive  equal  pay  for  equal  work". 
Article  119  of  the  EC  Treaty  was  amplified  by  the  Equal  Pay  Directive 
75/117/EEC,  which  introduced the  concept of equal  pay  for  work  of equal. 
value. 
However,  despite  the  existence of this  Community  legislation,  which all 
Member  States  have  transposed  into  their  national  legislation,  the 
attainment  of  equal  pay  for  women  is not  yet  a  reality.  The  overall. pay 
gap  between  women  and  men  in  the  Community  is still wide  and,  in  some 
cases,  still widening  due  to  economic difficulties  which .have  tended  to 
affect women  more  severely than  men. 
Although  there  is  an  absence  of  adequate  data  for  accurate  wage 
comparisons  between  men  and  women  throughout  the  Community,  recent 
figures  indicate  that  women  tend  to  work  in  significantly  lower  paid 
jobs  than men  .  The differential in pay  between men  and  women  throughout 
the  Member  States  of  the  European  Community  in  1990  is  indicated in the 
following  Table  on  the  average  value placed  on  women's .work  (3) 5 
Manual  (hourly)  Non-manual  (monthly) 
% of male  rate  % of male  rate 
Belgium  75.9  64.6 
Denmark  84.5 
France  90.8  66.6 
Germany  73.2  66.8 
Greece  76.3  69.8 
Ireland  69.1 
Italy  82.7  69.2 
Luxembourg  65.1  54.9 
Netherlands  75.3  65.5 
Portugal  71.6  70.7 
Spain  71.9  62.3 
UK  68.2  54.2 
The  increasing  participation  of  women  in  the  labour  market  (in  1991, 
women  represented  40%  of  the  total  working  population  in  Community 
countries)  has  not  been  accompanied  by  any  major  diversification  as 
regards  the  jobs  they  do  and  the  sectors in which  they work.  Throughout 
the  Community,  both  horizontal  and  vertical  segreg~tion  remains  a 
dominant  feature  of  the  structure of  female  employment. 
The  effect  of  segregation  amplified  by  the  undervaluing  of  female 
occupations  is  a  major  reason  for  the  persistance  of  significant 
disparities  in wage  levels. 
Because  of  occupational  segregation,  job  evaluation  or  classification 
schemes  rarely compare  men  and  women's  work  from  a  common  standard.  When 
a  typical  woman's  job  is  compared  with  a  typical  man's  job  in  a 
classification system,  the factors  considered and evaluated to calculate 
the  remuneration  nearly  always  result  in  a  higher  wage  for  a  typical 
man's  job  than  for  a  typical  woman's  job.  Such  a  result  is  generally 
obtained under a  pre-established value system where more points are given 
to  i.e.  physical  strength,  responsability  vis-a-vis  capital  investment 
more  than  vis-a-vis  human  beings,  training  rather  than  to  skills 
necessary  to  perform the  job,  dexterity etc  . 6 
Obviously,  reclassification of  undervalued  female  work  will  not  address 
discrimination in all its guises,  since  the  classification of  jobs  does 
not  ultimately determine  pay  rates. 
The  discrepancies  between  women  and  men's  pay  among  Member  States arise 
as  well  from the variations in employment structures and reward systems. 
Differentials  are  affected  by  a  number  of  factors  including  the  extent 
and  nature  of  atypical  work  as  a  proportion  of "full-time"  employment, 
governmental wage policies,  and  arrangements  for collective bargaining. 
Indeed,  collective  agreements  often  perpetuate  women's  difficulties  in 
getting access to additional payments  and benefits through negotiations, 
particularly  at  local  levels.  Additional  allowances  for  unfavourable 
working conditions and attendance,  for example,  remain almost exclusively 
the preserve of male  occupations. 
In  the  light  of  the  framework  outlined  above,  horizontal  and  vertical 
segregation  on  the  labour  market  are  intrinsically  linked  to 
discrimination  in  pay.  In  ,order·  to  break  what  appears  to  be  a  self-
perpetuating  cycle  of  discrimination  on  the  labour  market,  it would 
appear necessary to develop  a  strategy to  combat  both pay discrimination 
and segregation which are the major obstacles to more  flexibility on  the 
labour market.  In today's context,  the reasons for pursuing such an issue 
are not only based on equity but on the necessity of ensuring that proper 
recognition is given to everyone's  skills and contribution to a  changing 
economy.  In  concrete  terms,  the  concept  of  equal  pay  for  work  of  equ.al 
value  means  that where  a  woman  undertakes  work  as  demanding  as  a  man's, 
even  though  the  work  is  different,  she  should  receive  the  same  pay  and 
benefits  unless  there  is  a  non-discriminatory  explanation  for  the 
differential. 
The Community's legal provisions on equal pay for work of equal value and 
the  jurisprudence  pe~taining  thereto  address  questions  of  a  quite 
complex  nature. 7 
There is a  clear need for clarification or refinement of the principle of 
equal pay for work of equal value,  so that individuals may  rely on it and 
national  courts  and  tribunals  may  apply  it  satisfactorily.  This 
Memorandum is offered as a  contribution to that clarification/refinernrnent 
process.  The  core  of  the  document  is  in  Part  II,  which  follows.  It 
comprises  an  overview  of  the  jurisprudence  of  the  European  Court  of 
Justice  and  covers  the  meaning  of  work  of  equal  value,  job 
classification,  job evaluation  and discrimination and definition of pay. 
Part III briefly addresses  the  need  for  further measures  to promote  the 
practical achievement  of  equal  pay  for  work  of  equal  value  and mentions 
possible elements  of  a  broad strategy towards  that end. PART II 
Chapter  1 
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SCMMARY  OVERVIEW  OF  THE  JURISPRUDENCE  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COURT 
OF  JUSTICE 
The  Meaning  of Work  of  Equal Value 
a)  The  Nature of Work  of Eaual Value 
The  principle  of  equal  pay  for  work  of  equal  value  is  intended  to 
redress  the  undervaluing of  jobs  undertaken primarily  by  women,  in 
particular, where they are found to be as demanding as different j·obs· 
more  usually  undertaken  by  men  (4).  The  concept  contemplates  the 
comparison of  radically different  jobs.  Despite the articulation of 
the principle at Community  level in the  equal  pay directive in  1975 
it remains  the  case that  the,re  has  been  no  litigation in this  area 
in  a  number  of  Member  States  (France,  Luxembourg,  Greece,  Italy). 
In  other  Member  States,  there  has  been  little litigation in  which 
different  jobs  have  actually  been  compared.  The  facts  of  the 
published cases  reveal  that the  claims often involve  the  comparison 
of  jobs  having different  job titles but that  the  duties  are  almost 
identical,  save  for  minor  or insignificant differences  in tasks. 
The  legislation of  a  number  of Member  States fails  to assist in the 
recognition  of  the  scope  of  the  principle  since  the  laws  contain 
either  no  definition or  no  clarification of it  (Luxembourg,  Italy, 
Belgium,  Spain,  Greece,  Portugal).  In  addition,  the  failure·' to 
include  the  concept  of  indirect  discrimination  in  the  prohibition 
against  dicrimination  in  legislation  (Greece),  contributes  to  a 
limited perception of the  equal  pay principle. 
The  use  by  some  courts  in  equal  pay  claims  of  tests  such  as 
"manifestly discriminatory"  implies  a  restriction of  the  equal  pay 
principle to work  which is identical or at least similar. 9 
Such  a  test  was  used  by  courts  in  Italy,  though it remains  to  be 
seen  whether  this  will  continue  to  be  the  case,  given  the 
introduction of the concept of indirect discrimination in legislation 
passed in April  1991. 
By  contrast,  legi'slation  in  France,  Germany,  Ireland,  the 
Netherlands  and  the  United  Kingdom  contains  either definitions  of 
equal  value  or  guidance  on  how  to  approach  such  claims.  All  of  the 
definitions  assess  the  determination  of  work  of  equal  value  by 
reference to the nature and demands  of actual work.  The approach set 
out  in  the  provisions  of  these Member  States defines  the principle 
of  equal  pay  for  work  of  equal  value  as  contemplated at  a  European 
level.  The  European  Court of  Justice*  has  held on  several  occasions 
that  the determination  of  equal  value  involves  a  comparison  of  the 
work  of  the  female  and  her  male  comparator  by  reference  to  the 
demands  of  the  work  undertaken  and  the  nature  of  the  tasks. 
In the infringement proceedings  against the United  Kingdom  (5),  the 
Court  considered  that  the  concept  of 
1 equal  value 
1  was  not  too 
"abstract"  to  be  applied  by  the  Court  but  held  that: 
"the implementation of the Directive implies that the assessment of 
the  "equal  value"  to  be  "attributed"  to  particular  work  may  be 
effected notwithstanding the employer's wishes, if necessary in the 
context of  adversary proceedings.  The  Member  States  must  endow  an 
authority  wi~h the  requisite  jurisdiction  to  decide  whether  work 
has  the  same  value as  other work,  after obtaining such information 
as  may  be  required". 
*Hereinafter  refered  to  as  "the  Court" 10 
Addressing  a  claim  concerning  the  "same  work",  the  Court  held  in 
McCarthy  Ltd  v  Wendy  Smith  (6): 
"in cases of actual discrimination falling within the scope of the 
direct application of Article 119 of the EC  Treaty,  comparisons are 
confined.to parallels  which  may  be  drawn  on  the basis of concrete 
apprais'als of the work actually performed by employees of different 
sex within the  same  establishment or  service". 
In  Gisela  Rummler  v  Date  Druck  GmbH  (7),  the  Court,  in considering 
whether  a  classification  scheme  might  be  discriminatory  on  grounds 
of gender,  ruled that the "nature of the tasks  involved in the  work 
to be performed"  should be  capable  of measurement  by  a  scheme. 
Considering the  finding  of  an  Equality Officer in Murphy  and others 
v  Bord  Telecom  Eireann  ( 8),  a  reference  from  the  High  Court  in 
Ireland,  the Court held that where the work had been assessed as more 
onerous  and therefore of  higher  value,  Article  119  of the  EC  Treaty 
prohibited  the  payment  of  lower  wages.  The  jobs  compared  by  the 
Equality Officer in the Murphy case were different and the mechanism 
for  comparing  the  jobs  was  by  assessment  of the nature  of  the  tasks 
a·nd  the  demands  made  upon  the  workers  in  carrying  out  these  tasks 
such  as skill,  effort,  responsibility etc. 
Since it is  the  nature  of  the  work  which  is important  in assessing 
whether  equal  work  is  undertaken  by  the  woman  and  the  man,  other 
factors  will not  be  relevant to that assessment.  The  European Court 
of  Ju~tice  found,  in  effect,  in  Jenkins  v  Kingsgate  (Clothing 
Productions)  LTD  (9),  that the fact that Ms  Jenkins worked part-time 
did  not  change  the  nature of  the  demands  of  the  job. 
Thus,  for the period of time the work  was  undertaken she was entitled 
to  be paid at the  same  rate as  her  full-time male  comparator unless 
the  difference  ih  pay  was  attributable  to  factors  which  were 
objectively  justified  and  were  in  no  way  related  to  any 
discrimination based  on  sex. 11 
In Nimz  v  Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg  (10),  addressing the question 
of whether seniority could justify a  pay differential,  the Court held 
that  : 
"Article 119 of the  EEC  Treaty must  be interpreted as precluding a 
collective  agreement,  entered  into  within  the  national  public. 
service,  from  providing  for  the  period  of  service  of  employees 
working at least three-quarters of normal working  time to be  fully 
taken into account  for  reclassification in a  higher salary grade, 
where only one-half of such period of service is taken into account 
in the  case of employees  whose  working  hours  are between one-half 
and  three-quarters  of  those  normal  working  hours  and  the  latter 
·group of employees  comprises  a  considerably smaller  percentage  of 
men  than  women,  unless  the  employer  can  prove  that  such  a 
provision  is  justified  by  factors  whose  objectivity  depends  in 
particular  on  the  relationship  between  the  nature  of  the  duties 
performed  and  the  experience afforded by  the  performance of  those 
duties  after  a  certain  number  of  working  hours  have  been 
completed." 
Member  States  have  different  mechanisms  for  resolving  individual 
claims  concerning  equal  pay  for  work  of  equal  value.  Each  of  the 
mechanisms  applied  includes  the  consideration  of  the  nature  and 
demands  of  the  different  jobs  compared  to  determine  whether  they 
are  of  equal  value: 
1)  In  Belgium,  France,  Italy  and  Luxembourg  many  problems  are 
resolved  by  "work  inspectorates".  Courts  required  to  resolve  a 
question  are  "not  necessarily  bound  by  the  results  of  job 
evaluation schemes". 
2)  In  the  Netherlands,  the  question  of  whether  work  is  of  equal 
value  is  assessed  on  the  basis  of  "a  reliable  system  of  job 
evaluation". 
3)  Under Irish legislation,  any dispute on the subject of equal pay 
can  be  referred to  one  of  three  Equality Officers. 12 
. ' 
b)  The  Scope of Comparisons  of Work  of Equal  Value 
i.  Men  and  women 
One  of the  fundamental  aims  of Article 119  of the  EC  Treaty and of 
the  Equal  Pay  Directive is "the elimination of all discrimination 
on grounds of sex" .  This presupposes -comparisons between persons of 
the opposite sex.  Comparisons cannot be made between persons of the 
same  sex.  However,  Article  119  of  the  EC  Treaty and  the  Directive 
do  not  preclude  claims  from  men  though  the  determining  factor  in 
equal  pay  claims  is whether  any differential is sex-based. 
European  law is silent on  who  is entitled to choose the comparator 
for the purposes of an equal pay claim.  However,  it appears that in 
·\. 
all Member  States,  it. is the. applicant who  chooses  the  comparator. 
In  a  case  before  the  Court  of  Appeal  in  the  Netherlands,  this 
approach  did  not  exclude  the  court  from  introducing  a  further 
comparator in circumstances where it considered that the applicant 
had inadvertently omitted  a  more  appropriate comparator  and  could 
not  be  expected  to  have  had  the  necessary  expertise  to  identify 
that particular person. 
ii.  Comparisons  can  be  made  by public  and private sector workers 
Both  public  and  private  sector  employees  can  pursue  claims  :in· 
respect of  equal  pay. 
In  Defrenne  v  Sabena  II  (ll)  the  Court  held that 
"Courts have a  duty to ensure the protection of the rights which 
this  provision. vests  in individuals,  in particular,  as  regards 
those types  of discrimination arising directly from legislative 
provisions and collective labour agreements,  as well as in cases 
in which men  and  women  receive unequal pay  fo·r  equal  work which 
is  carried  out  in  the  same  establishment  or  service,  whether 
public or private". 13 
iii.  Actual  or  Hypothetical  Comparators 
Neither Article 119 of the EC  Treaty nor Article 1  of the Equal  Pay 
Directive  specify any  requirement  of  an  actual  comparator  of  the 
opposite  sex  . 
In the  case  of McCarthys  Ltd  v  Wendy  Smith  (12)  ,  Ms  Smith  argued 
that  a  female  worker  can  rely  on Article  119  of the  EC  Treaty in 
order  to  claim the  pay  to  which  she  would  be entitled if she  were 
a  man,  even  if  there  are  or  were  no  male  employees  in  the 
undertaking or service concerned who  perform or performed the same 
work  (the "hypothetical male worker"  criterion).  She  was  supported 
in  her  arguments  by  the  Commission  and  by  the  Advocate-General. 
However,  the  Court  rejected  Ms  Smith's  arguments  on  the  basis 
that: 
"in cases  of  actual  discrimination falling within  the  scope  of 
the direct application of Article 119,  comparisons  are confined 
to  parallels  which  may  be  drawn  on  the  basis  of  concrete 
appraisals  of  the  work  actually  performed  by  employees  of 
different  sex  within  the  same  establishment  or  service". 
Therefore,  applying the principle of equal pay found in Article 119 
of the  EC  Treaty,  the  woman  is  required to  show  there is  an  actual 
man  employed who  receives or received more pay than the woman  doing 
equal  work  for  the  employer. 
McCarthys  rules that a  hypothetical comparison cannot be made under 
Article  119  of  the  EC  Treaty,  in circumstances  where it is alleged 
that  the  same  work  is  being  undertaken  by  the  woman  and  the  man. 
However,  the  Court's  reluctance  to  allow  a  claim  based  on  the 
"hypothetical comparator"  was,  after all,  linked to its reluctance 
to accord direct effect to Article 119 of the  EC  Treaty in cases of 
disguised  and  indirect  discrimination  As  it  has  long  since 
abandoned that reluctance, it may  perhaps yield,  in the future,  to 
the  arguments  in  favour  of  the "hypothetical male  comparator". 14 
It must be pointed out that in another context  (13_),  the Court has 
already held that in cases of direct discrimination on the basis of 
the criterion of sex,  the  requirement  for  a  male  comparator to be 
adduced may  even not  apply. 
iv.Contemporaneous  employment 
The  principle  of  equal  pay  for  equal  work  is  not  confined  to  a 
situation where  the  woman  undertakes  equal  work  contemporaneously 
with the male comparator where it is established that she  receives 
less  pay  than  her  predecessor  carrying  out  the  equal  work 
(McCarthys  v  Smith). 
v.  Are  Comparisons  Restricted to  the  Same  Establishment? 
It  is  clear  that  work  compared  for  the  purpose  of  determining 
whether it is of equal  value  encompasses  diverse  jobs. 
Defrenne  II  makes  it clear  that  comparisons  for  the  purpose  of 
determining  equal  work  are  at  least  possible  in  ·the  "same 
establishment" .  It  is  not  clear  however  that  this  must  be 
understood  as  excluding  comparisons  between  different 
establishments  within  the  same  employment  structure.  Indeed,  a 
restriction of  this nature  could easily defeat  the purpose of  the 
principle  of  equal  pay  for  work  of  equal  value  given  that  women 
often  work  in  different  plants  from  men  employed  by  the  same 
company. 
In  Defrenne II,  the  Court  gave  a  clear guide  to  the  Member  States 
on  the  implications  of  the  complete  implementation  of Article  119 
of the  EC  Treaty  and  the  Directive as it would affect 
"not  only ..  individual  undertakings  but  also  entir~ branches  of 
industry and  even  of  the  economic  system as  a  whole,  and  may  in 
certain  cases  involve  the  elaboration  of  criteria  whose 
implementation necessitates  the  taking  of appropriate measures 
at Community  and  national  level"  (14) 15 
This  comment  was  made  specifically in the context of extending the 
narrow criterion of equal  work  to encompass  the principle of equal 
pay  for  work  of  equal  value  established  by  the  provisions  of 
Convention  N°  100  on  equal  pay  concluded  by  the  International 
Labour Organisation in  1951. 
However,  it is not  clear whether  the approach extends  the  scope of 
comparison  of  the  jobs  undertaken  by  women  and  men  to  cover  the 
enforcement  of  the  right  to  equal  pay  to  intra-or-cross  industry 
claims.  In Defrenne II,  the Court was pointing to the need for more 
detailed provisions  than  those  contained  in Article  119  of  the  EC 
Treaty in order  for this to be  possible.  Much  therefore depends  on 
the  nature  of  national  provisions  implementing  the  principle  of 
equal  pay. 
Member  States  in  the  Defrenne  II  case  recognised  the  potential 
financial  impact  of  eliminating  gender  discrimination  in  pay 
systems  across  all sections  of  industry. 
The  United  Kingdom  submitted that: 
"the  cumulative  effects  of  the  resulting  increases  in  labour 
costs  would  seriously  aggravate  the  problems  of  controlling 
inflation.  The  finan.cial  implications  vary  in  terms  of  the 
proportion of  women  doing "equal work"  with men,  the difference 
between men's  rates  and woman's  rates  for equal  work,  liquidity 
problems  and  the proportion of labour costs  to total costs. 
The footware and food industries,  laundries,  retail distribution 
and the clothing industry have a  particularly high proportion of 
women  doing  equal  work.  The  highest differential  between  men's 
rates  and  women's  rates  exist  in  the  textile,  clothing, 
footware,  biscuit manufacturing and engineering industries. Many 
firms,  in various  sectors,  have  serious  cash  flow  problems. 16 
The  proportion of  labour  costs  to total costs is particularly 
high  in  the  ship  building,  instrument  engineering~  clothing, 
paper  and printing and pottery industries. 
The  clothing  industry  is  thus  running  a  particularly  high 
potential risk.  Discrimination in rates  of  pay  between  men  and 
women  is not  limited to  any particular type of occupation. 
The  overall increase in labour costs as  a  resul~ of introducing 
equal  pay is likely to be  of  the  order of  3.5%  of  the National 
Wages  and  Salaries  Bill,  which  was  intended  to  be  spread  over 
five  years  ending  1975". 
Ireland submitted that  equal  pay: 
"would involve extremely heavy financial obligations. As  regards 
the  private, sector it appears  tha~ these obligations  cannot  be 
directly estimated.  They  must,  however,  affect privately owned 
companies  and  small  firms,  the  activities  of  the  textile, 
clothing  and  footware,  food  processing,  light  engineering  and 
paper and printing industries in particular,  as well as sections 
of  the  retail  trade.  In  many  of  the  sectors  referred  to  the 
majority of the  work  force  would  have  a  claim for  equal  pay. 
The average figure for the order of increase in wages  and salary 
bills involved in the immediate  implementation of equal pay  for 
men and women  in manufacturing industry would be  5%.  It would be 
high in the most  sensitive sectors". 
In the infringement proceedings against Denmark  (15),  the Advocate-
General  set out his  view  of  the  full  implications  of  implementing 
equal  pay  for  work  of equal  value: 17 
"as  appears  from  the  second  sentence  of  Article  1  of  the 
Directive however,  a  comparison of duties within the  same  fixed 
establishment  of  an  undertaking  or  even  within  a  single 
undertaking  will  not  always  be  sufficient.  In  certain 
circumstances  comparison  with  work  of  equal  value  in  other 
undertakings  covered  by  the  collective  agreement  in  question 
will be  necessary. 
As  is  correctly observed  in  the  annual  report  for  1980  of  the 
Danish Council for Equal Treatment of Men  and Women  submitted by 
the Commission as Annex VIII  to its application,  in sectors with 
a  traditionnally  female  work  force,  comparison  with  other 
sectors  may  even  be  necessary. 
In certain circumstances,  the  additional  criterion of  the  same 
place  of  work  for  work  of  equal  value  may  therefore  place  a 
restriction  on  the principle of  equal  pay  laid down  in Article 
119  of  the  Treaty  and  amplified in the  Directive in  question. 
The mere fact  that such  a  supplementary condition for equal pay 
which  has  no  foundation  in Article  119  or in  the  D1rective  has 
been  added  must  in  any  event  be  regarded  as  a  infringement  of 
the  Treaty.  That  supplementary  condition  limits  the  scope, 
governed  by  the  Treaty,  of  the  extension  of  the  principle  of 
equal  pay for  men  and  women  to activities  for  equal  value". 
The  Court  was  not  specifically asked  to  rule  on  this  point  since 
the proceedings concerned only the failure of Denmark to articulate 
in national  law the principle of  equal  pay  for  work  of  equal  value 
at all rather than the extent of comparisons between organisations. 
A  number of the cases before the Court have concerned the operation 
of  national  legislative provisions  (Rinner-Kuhn  (16)  Botel  (17)), 
and national collective agreements  (Danfoss  (18)  Nimz  (19),  Rummler 
(20),  Kowalska  (21)). 18 
Such  provisions  and  agreements  clearly  span  different  establishments 
and,  in  a  number  of  instances,  different  industries.  This,. therefore, 
has  implications  for  any  geographical  or  regional  restrictions  on 
comparisons.  The  laws  in  a  number  of  Member  States  (Germany,  Italy and 
Greece)  are  silent  on  the  question  of  whether  or  not  intFa-industry 
comparisons  are  possible.  However,  in  some  cases  it·appears  that  such 
comparisons may not be excluded in circumstances where the applicant and 
comparator  are  covered by  the  same  collective agreement. 
At  the  same  time  there  is also  on  occasions,  a  restrictive approach  to 
comparisons  in the  same  organisation which  preclude  comparisons  between 
groups  of  workers  covered  by  different  collective  agreements.  Such 
restrictions fail to take account of the segregated nature of the labour 
market  in  which  men  and  women  will  often  be  covered  by  separate 
agreements  because of their different occupations. 
Very  recently,  the  Court  was  asked  to  rule  on  this  point  in  the  case 
Enderby  (22).  The Court's ruling was  made  in a  case referred by the Court 
of Appeal  of  England  and Wales  involving  a  female  speech therapist,  who 
brought  an  action  against her  employers  for  sex discrimination. 
Mrs  Pamela  Enderby's  rate of pay set by  a  collective agreement.  Her union 
also  negotiated  with  her  employer,  under  a  different  collective 
agreement,  on  behalf  of  a  group  of  people  including  pharmacists  and 
physiotherapists. The latter's pay rates,  at the same level of seniority, 
were significantly greater than Enderby's.  She therefore brought an equal 
pay  claim,  based  on  the  work  of  the  pharmacist  and  physiotherapist 
(largely staffed by men)  which is assumed to be of equal value to her own 
work  as  a  'speech  therapist  (which  is  overwhelmingly  a  female 
profession) .. 
The  Court  was  asked  whether  it  was  sufficient  justification  for  the 
difference  in pay if the  rates  of pay  for  the  jobs  in question  had been 
decided  by  collective  bargaining  processes  which  considered  separately 
have  no  discriminatory effect. 19 
The  Court held that "the fact that the  rates of pay at issue are decided 
by  collective bargaining processes  conducted separately  for  each  of  the 
two  professional  groups  concerned,  without  any  discrimination  effect 
within  each  group,  does  not  preclude  a  finding  of  prima  facie 
discrimination  where  the  results  of  those  processes  show  that  the  two 
groups  with  the  same  employer  and  the  same  trade  union  are  treated 
differently.  If the employer  could rely on  the absence of discrimination 
within  each  of  the  collective bargaining  processes  taken  separately  as 
sufficient  justification  for  the  difference  in  pay,  he  could  easily 
circumvent  the  priciple  of  equal  pay  by  using  separate  bargaining 
processes"  (23).  As  in ·Defrenne  II  (4),  the  decision  of  the  Court  in 
Enderby  does  not  deal  with  the  question  of  intra-or-cross  industry 
claims. 
Chapter  2:  Job  Classification,  Job  Evaluation  and  Discrimination 
a)  Job Claaaification and Job Evaluation 
Job  classification  tends  to  be  the  term  used  on  the  mainland  of 
Europe  whilst the  term job evaluation is  used  in United  Kingdom  and 
in Ireland.  Job classification is often a  non-analytical process used 
to  categorise  jobs.  These  type  of  schemes  are  used  extensively 
throughout  Europe.  Job  evaluation  is  often  perceived  to  be  an 
analytical means  by which  the  relative  job demands  are assessed. 
Job evaluation or classification is a  mechanism which  can be used  to 
determine  the hierarchy or hierachies of  jobs in an  organ~sation or 
group  of  undertakings  as  the basis  for  explaining  a  pay  system. 
It sets  out  to measure  the  relative  value  of  jobs,  not  that of  the 
job  holders.  Ideally,  the  performance  of  the  individual  should  not 
enter into job evaluation although,  in practice,  it may  be difficult 
to dissociate individuals  from their  jobs. 20 
The  aim  of  such  schemes  is  to  provide  an  acceptable  rationale  for 
determining  the  pay  of  existing hierarchies  of  jobs.  They  were  and 
remain a  management tool to achieve an acceptable rank order of jobs, 
implemented unilaterally or with varying degrees of participation by 
the  workforce.  Acceptability,  consensus  and  the  maintenance  of 
traditional  hierarchical  structures  are  essential  ingredients  of 
such  mechanisms. 
Job  evaluation  schemes  do  not directly determine  rates  of pay.  The 
rate  for  the  job or the salary market  for  a  job grade is influenced 
by  a  number  of  factors  outside the scope of most  schemes.  Often,  the 
pay determinants and indeed hierarchies are linked to external market 
pay  rates,  the  relative  bargaining  strengths  of  the  negotiating 
bodies  and  traditional patterns  of pay differentials  between  jobs. 
Job  evaluation is  conce·rned with  relationships, ·not  absolutes. 
It cannot  measure  in definite  terms  the  inherent  value  of  a  jpb  to 
the  organisation,  it  is  essentially  a  comparative  p·rocess: 
comparisons  with  other  jobs,  comparisons  against  defined  standards 
or  comparisons  of  the  degree  to.which  a  common  criterion or  factor 
is present in different  jobs  (24). 
Generally,  such  systems  fall  into  two  identified  categories;  a) 
analytical  or  b)  non-analytical.  In  general  terms,  the distinction 
between  the  two  categories is that  jobs are either broken down  into 
their component elements  for the.purposes of comparison  {analytical) 
or alternatively,  the  relative worth  of  the jobs  may  be  based  on  a 
whole  job  comparison  (non-analytical). 
The more formal  types of schemes,. particulary analytical schemes,  may 
be  more  objective  than  non-analytical  classification  of  jobs. 
However,  no  scheme  can  ever  be  fully  objective  since  the  whole· 
process is based on  a  series of judgements made about facts presented 
to evaluators.  These judgements reflect each evaluator's background, 
experience,  and attitudes. 21 
However,  analytical schemes  can be used to improve the mechanisms  by 
which  work  is  assessed  in  that  they  require  the  collection  and 
analysis  of  data  about  the  content  of  work  to  be  consistent.  The 
articulation of criteria and  factors  means  that evaluators may  have 
to  justify decisions  about  the  ranking  of  jobs  in  a  more  objective 
way  rather than  relying  on  subjective opinion. 
A disadvantage from the point of view of assessing whether different 
work  i~  of  equal  value is that  many  systems  for  comparing  jobs  are 
unable  to  take  account  of  the  diverse  content  of  jobs  and  are  not 
capable  of  comparing  the  very  different  types  of  jobs.  Generally, 
they  cover  only parts  of organisations  where  "families"  of  jobs  of 
a  similar nature  can  easily be  compared  for  the  purpose  of  ranking 
eg.  Production  and  production  related  jobs  - unskilled  operative, 
semi-skilled operative,  skilled operative, "tradesman", chargehand, 
supervisor,  manager. 
Often,  different  hierarchies  of  jobs  based  on  different  evaluation 
and classification schemes co-exist in an organisation wit!. no common 
yardstick from which to measure the relative value of diverse groups 
of  jobs,  for  example,  production and clerical workers.  Since it was 
not  perceived  as  necessary  to  compare,  for  example,  the  relative 
demands  of the  job of  a  secretary with those of  a  skilled production 
worker,  there  is  no  basis  from  which  to  determine  whether  the 
traditionally  female  job  of  secretary  is  equally  demanding  as  the 
often traditionally male  job. 
It has  been  argued  that  job  evaluation is  inflexible.  It sets  out 
to  assess  only  the  demands  of  a  range  of  jobs.  It  does  not  take 
account  of market  forces  or individual  performance.  Changes  in some 
organisations  are  leading  to  the  dismantling  of  hierarchical 
structures  and  their  replacement  with  flatter  more  flexible 
workforces  undertaking  interchangeable  tasks.  Often  an  analysis  of 
average pay levels,  gender and job grades  reveals organisations that 
are  in practice less  hierarchical  than  would  appear. ·22 
These  features  of  traditional  job  evaluation  and  classification 
become  significant when  attempting  to  address  gender  inequality in 
pay  systems.  Given  the  segregation of male  and  female  workers,  the 
relative worth of work needs  to be-measured by reference to a  common 
standard  within  one  place  of  employment,  within  an  industry  or 
between  industries.  Equally,  the different  elements  in  female  wor.k 
need to be identified and valued in the  same  way as those present in 
male  work. 
Pay  systems  based  on  such  schemes  may  have  been  in  place  in 
organisations for many years and the traditional hierarchies of jobs 
often predate,  without  any  review,  the  introduction of  legislation 
on,  gender  equality and  the  increased participation of  women  in the 
workplace.  Many  of  the  systems  incorporate  and  legitimate  the 
tradition of paying women  less even when they undertake the same  jobs 
as  men. 
b)  Job  Evaluation and Classification and European  Law 
Article  1  of  the  Equal  Pay  Directive provides: 
"In  particular,  where  a  job  classification  system  is  used  for 
deterrni·ning  pay,  it must  be  based  on  the  same  criteria for  both men 
and  women  and  so  drawn  up  as  to  exclude  any  discrimination  on  the 
grounds  of sex". 
The  Directive  does  not  mandate  the  implementation  of  job 
classification by employers  to determine pay.  However,  it propibits 
gender discrimination where  such systems.are used by employers  as  a 
basis  for  determining  pay  rates.  There  is  no  definition  in  the 
Directive  of  the  term ·.,a  job classification system". 
A  number  of  judgments  of  the  Court  have  contained  guidance  on  the 
role and nature  of  job  classification and  job evaluation. In  Defrenne  v  Sabena 
Court's  attention  "to 
wage  formation  and 
23 
II  (25),  the  European  Commission  drew  the 
the  diversity  of  the  traditional  methods  of 
the  widely  differing  systems  of  job 
classification" which existed in the Community,  in the context of the 
difficulties of  implementing  equal  pay  between  women  and  men. 
In McCarthys  Ltd  v  Wendy  Smith  (26),  the  Court  recognised  that,  in 
order  to  identify indirect  and  disguised discrimination,  there  was 
a  need  for: 
"comparative studies of entire branches of industry and therefore, 
as  a  prerequisite,  the  elaborating  by  the  Community  and  national 
legislative bodies  of criteria of  assessment". 
This  would  appear  to 
techniques  as  well  as 
differences. 
encompass  classification  and  evaluation 
statistical  analyses  of  pay  and  gender 
In  the  jurisprudence  of  the  Court,  the  term  "job  classification" 
appears  to  be  used  to  include  any  technique  which  categorises  jobs 
whether  formal  or  informal,  analytical  or  non-analytical.  The  term 
covers  both classification and  evaluation.  It does  not  appear  to  be 
used  in  a  technical  sense.  In  the  infringement  proceedings  against 
the  United  Kingdom,  the  respondent  government  tends  to  refer 
throughout its submissions  to "job evaluation"  and  the  Court  refers 
in  its  judgement  to  "job  classification".  Neither  term  is  ever 
defined. 
The  Court  held  that  the  United  Kingdom  had  failed  to  implement  the 
provisions  of  Directive  75/117  because: 
"it  has  not  introduced  into  its  national  legal  system  measures 
necessary to  enable all employees  who  consider  themselves  wronged 
by  failure  to  apply  the  principle  of  equal  pay  for  men  and  women 
for work  to which equal value is attributed and for which no  system 
of  job  classification  exists  to  obtain  recognition  of  such 
equivalence  (27)". 24 
In  coming  to  this decision it found  that: 
"the job classification system is,  under tfie Directive,  merely one 
of  several  methods  for  determining  pay  for  work  to  which  equal 
value is attributed(28)". 
The  Court  found  that  the  UK  governement' s  interpretation  of  the 
Directive: 
"amounts  to  a  denial of the very existence of a  right to equal  pay 
for work of equal value where  no classification has been made.  Such 
a  position is  not  consonant  with  the  general  scheme  of provisions 
of the Directive.  The  preamble to the-Directive indicates that its 
essential purpose is to implement  the principle that men  and  women 
should receive equal pay contained in Article 119 of the Treaty and 
that it is  primarily  the  responsability  of  the  Member  States  to 
ensure  the  application  of  this  principle  by  means  of  appropriate 
laws,  regulations  and administrative provisions in such  a  way that 
all  employees  in  the  Community  can  be  protected  in  these 
matters(29)". 
The  UK  government  had  argued  that  there  was  no  provision  in  the 
Directive enabling an employee-to insist on  the determination of pay 
by  a  job  evaluation  system.  On  that  basis,  the  UK  government 
concluded that the worker  cannot insist on  a  comparative evaluation 
of  different  work  by  a  job  evaluation  method,  the  introd~ction of 
which  is at  the  employer's discretion. 
The  Court  spelt  out  the  role  of  job  classification  systems  in  the 
context  of  the  principle  of  equal  pay  set out in the  Directive: 25 
"  the principle is defined in the  first paragraph  of Article  1  so 
as  to  include  under  the  term  the  same  work,  the  case  of  work  to 
which equal value is attributed and the second paragraph emphasises 
merely  that  where  a  job  classification  system  is  used  for 
determining pay it is necessary to ensure that it is based  on  the 
same  criteria for both men  and women  and so drawn  up to exclude any 
discrimination on  grounds  of  sex. 
It follows that where there is a  disagreement as to the application 
of  that  concept,  a  worker  must  be  entitled  to  claim  before  an 
appropriate  authority  that  his  work  has  the  same  value  as  other 
work  and if that is  found  to be  the  case  to  have  his  rights  under 
the  Treaty  and  the  Directive  acknowledged  by  a  binding  decision. 
Any  method  which  excludes  that  option  prevents  the  aim  of  the 
Directive  from  being  achieved" (30) 
The  Court  held  that: 
"the implementation of the Directive implied that the assessment of 
the  "equal  value"  to  be  attributed  to  particular  work  .may  be 
effected notwithstanding the employer's wishes, if necessary in the 
context of adversarial proceedings.  The Member States mu'st  endow an 
authority with the requisite juridiction to decide whether work has 
the  same  value  as  other  work  after  obtaining  such  information  as 
may  be  required"  (31). 
In  considering  alternatives  to  job  classification  by  means  of 
resolving equal value claims,  the Commission set out its view of the 
obligation of  Member  States: 
"to determine whether  two different jobs  have an equal value,  they 
must  be  compared  one  with  the  other or  evaluated  against  a  common 
standard.  That  being  so,  Member  States  have  a  duty  to  set  up  a 
system  whereby  employees  are  able  to  obtain,  if  necessary  by 
recourse  to  the  courts,  equal  pay  for  work  of  equal  value. 26 
This  means  that  it is  not  necessary  to  oblige  all  employers  'to 
adopt  job  evaluation  schemes,  but  at  the  same  time  enabling 
employers  to  choose  whether  or  not  to  introduce  such  schemes· 
without  makinq  any  provision  for  equal  pay  in  respect  of  jobs  of 
equal  value  where  they do  not,  is inadequate(32)". 
The  Commission  found that in many  cases,  work of equal value will be 
compared  within  the  framework  of  a  collective  agreement  or  under  a 
job evaluation scheme or even more informally without any details of 
the jobs being obtained.  As mentioned earlier, various Member  States 
have introduced a variety of mechanisms to determine whether work was 
of  equal  value. 
In Belgium,  France,  Italy,  Luxembourg  and Germany the duty lay with 
"work  inspectorates" .  In  the  Netherlands,  the  question  of  whether 
work  is  of  equal  value  was  assessed  on  the  basis  of  "a  reliable 
system of  job  evaluation".  Under  Irish legislation,  any  dispute  on 
the subject of  equal  pay  could be  referred to  one  of three equality 
officers. 
The  UK  government  emphasised practical considerations  and  saw  that 
"considerable  expense"  would  be  involved in  "compulsory  evaluation 
schemes". 
It is clear from the United  Kingdom case that there is no obligation 
on  employers  to  introduce  job  classification  or  job  evaluation 
schemes.  The  obligation  is  that  where  an  organisation  uses  such  a 
scheme  it must  not  discriminate  on  'grounds  of  gender.  This  is  to 
state  no  more  than  that legislation,  collective  agreements  and  pay 
systems  covering  the  issue  addressed  by  the  Directive  must  not  be 
discriminatory on  grounds  of  gender. 27 
Where  a  dispute  arises  as  to  whether  work  is  of  equal  value,  the 
Member  States  are  required  to  provide  a  process  by  which  an 
assessment  of  value  can  be  made.  Such  a  process  appears  to  involve 
in  all  Member  States  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent,  some  form  of 
comparison  based on  job evaluation or classification techniques. 
In  the  case  of  Rurnrnler  v  Dato  Druck  GmbH  ( 31) ,  Ms  Rurnrnler  who  was 
employed  by  a  printing  firm,  sought  reclassification  to  a  higher 
category in the pay scale.  The  conditions of the remuneration of the 
printing industry were  governed  by  a  Framework  Wage  Rate  Agreement 
for  Industrial  Employees  of  the  Printing  Industry in  the  territory 
of the Federal Republic of Germany including West Berlin. It provided 
for  seven  wage  groups,  corresponding  to  the  work  carried out  and 
determined according  to the  following  factors: 
a)  Degree  of  knowledge 
b)  Concentration 
c)  Muscular  demand  or  effect 
d)  Responsibility 
Ms  Rurnrnler  felt  she  should  be  classified  as  wage  group  4  not  3 
because in particular she was  required to pack parcels weighing more 
than  20  kilograrnrnes,  which  for her  represented heavy physical work. 
To  be  reclassified to wage  group  4,  the weights  had  to be  more  than 
50  kilograrnrnes. 
The  Arbeitsgericht Oldenburg  referred to  the  Court  the  question 
of  whether  a  job classification system based  on  criteria of muscle 
demand  or muscular  effort  and  the  heaviness  of  work  was  compatible 
with  the principle of equal  pay  for  men  and  women. 
The  Court  having  determined  that  the  nature  of  the  work  should  be 
considered "objectively"  held that: 28 
"Where  a  job  classification  system  is  used  in  determining 
remuneration,  that  system  must  be  based  on  criteria  which  do  not 
differ according  to  whether  the  work  is carried out  by  a  man  or  by 
a  woman  and must  not  be  organised as  a  whole  in such  a  manner  that 
it  has  the  practical  effect  of  discriminating  generally  against 
workers  of  one  sex"  ( 34) . 
The Court laid down three guiding principles following from paragraph 
2  of Article  1  of Directive  75/117  that: 
a)  "The criteria governing pay rate classification must ensure ·that 
work which is objectively the same attracts the. same  rate of pay 
whether it is performed by  a  man  or  a  woman. 
b)  The use of values  reflecting the average performance of workers 
of one  sex as  a  basis  for  determining  the  extent  to which  work 
makes  demands  or  requires  effort  or  whether  it  is  heavy 
constitutes a  form of discrimination on  grounds  of  sex contrary 
to  the  Directive. 
c)  In  order  for  a  job  classi(ication  system  not  to  be 
discriminatory as  a  whole it must,  insofar as  the nature of  the 
tasks carried out in the undertaking permits,  take into account 
criteria  for  which  workers  of  each  sex  may  show  a  particular 
ap'titude  (35)". 
These  guiding principles  set out  that in the  context of  a  dispute  a 
job  classification  system  under  Article  1  paragraph  2  of  the 
Directive  must  be  formal,  analytical,  factor  based  and  non-
discriminatory. 29 
The  Danfoss  (36)  case  concerned  a  system  of  pay,  set  out  in  a 
collective  agreement,  according  to  which  all  workers  of  the  same 
category  received  the  same  basic  salary.  Under  the  collective 
agreement,  however,  the  employer  was  allowed  to  make  additional 
payments  to  individuals  within  a  grade  on  the basis  of  a  number  of 
criterion - flexibility,  vocational  training and  seniority. 
The  Court  held that where  an  undertaking applies  a  pay system which 
is  totally  lacking  in  transparency,  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the 
employer  to  show  that his  pay practice is not  discriminatory where 
a  female  worker  establishes,  by  comparison  with  a  relatively large 
number  of  employees,  that the  average  payment  of  female  workers  is 
lower  than  that of male  workers. 
The  concept  of transparency articulated in  Danfoss  is applicable to 
every  element  of  the  determination  of  a  pay  system,  including  any 
form  of  classification. 
In  Danfoss,  the  work  of  the  women  and  male  comparators  was 
established as  equal.  This merely confirms that before any system of 
classification can be considered as a  justification for the different 
grading  of  jobs,  the  Court  seized  of  a  dispute,  must  itself,  with 
relevant  information,  determine  the  nature  and  demands  of  jobs 
compared  for  the  purposes  of  equal  pay.  Job  classification  and 
evaluation  may  be  reasons  justifying  differences  in  pay  but  their 
neutrality and appropriateness  for particular jobs must  be assessed 
against  a  review  by  the  courts  of  the  nature  of  disputed  jobs  to 
comply with  the  Directive. 
Generally,  it appears  that  the  laws  of  Member  States  provide  that 
grading,  classification  and  evaluation  systems  are  matters  to  be 
taken  into  account  in  the  same  way  as  any  other  reason  put  forward 
by  employers  to  justify  a  pay  differential  once  the  nature  and 
demands  of  the  work  compared  have  been  assessed objectively. 30 
However,  in the courts  of  some  Member  States,  when  considering such 
schemes  as  justifications for pay differentials,  there appears to be 
a  reluctance to scrutinise to any great degree  the operation of  job· 
evaluation  or  classification schemes  to determine  whether  they are 
discriminatory. 
This  is particularly so  where  the  schemes  appear  to  be  analytical. 
There  is  also  little  doubt  that  applicants,  their  trade  union 
representatives,  lawyers,  national labour inspectorates and indeedi 
in some instances specialist agencies themselves are ui)able to assist 
the courts in identifying gender discrimination in  schemes  owing  to 
their  own  lack of understanding  of  the  topic. 
c)  The  Implementation of Pay Structures 
The  implementation  of  modified  job  evaluation  and  classification·. 
schemes  designed  to  address  positively the  undervaluing  of  women's 
work may  be  limited by economic constraints.  For example,  a  modified 
scheme may  revalue women's  work as  equivalent to male work.  However, 
in attaching pay rates to the new system the  amount selected may  riot 
reflect the  male  pay  rate but  rather  a  lowe~figure. 
In  such  circu~stances,  male  jobs  may  remain  on  protected pay  rates 
as  an  interim  measure.  However,  the  long  term  effect  may  be,  in 
reality,  the introduction of  a  pay  rate which is in fact  the  female 
rate fo,r all employees.  Tbis,  of course,  implies an overall worsening 
of  conditions,  which  is  not  the  result  aimed  at  by  the  social 
provisions  of  the Treaty. .,. 
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The  principle  of  "levelling-up"  (extension  of  the  more  favourable 
provision  to  the disadvantaged  group  in  cases  where  discrimination 
has been determined)  has been enunciated in a  number  of cases before 
the Court.  In general terms,  the Court considers that in the face of 
a  discrimination  cont~ary  to  Conununity  law,  the  group  set  at  a 
disadvantage by that discrimination is entitled to be treated in the 
same  manner,  and to have the same  rules applied to it, as  the others 
recipients,  since  those  rules  remain  the  only  valid  point  of 
reference. (37) 
Quite recently,  in Kowalska  v  Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg the Court 
held that: 
"where there is indirect discrimination in a  clause in a  collective 
wage  agreement,  the  class  of  persons  placed  at  a  disadvantage  by 
reason of  that discrimination must  be  treated in the  same  way  and 
made  subject  to  the  same  scheme,  proportionately to  the  number  of 
hours  worked,  as  other workers,  such  scheme  remaining  for  want  of 
the  correct  implementation  of  Article  119  of  the  EEC  Treaty  in 
national  law,  the  only valid system of  reference  (38)". 
In  Nimz  again,  the  Court  held: 
"where  there  is  indirect  discrimination  in  a  provision  of  a 
collective agreement,  the  national  court is  required  to set aside 
that provision,  without requesting or awaiting its prior removal by 
collective  negociation  or  any  other  procedure,  and  to  apply  to 
members  of  the group disadvantaged by that discrimination the  same 
arrangements  which  are  applied  to  other  employees,  arrangements 
which  failing  the  correct  application  of  Article  119  of  the  EEC 
Treaty in national law,  remains  the only valid system of  reference 
(39)". 32 
These ,two judgements merely confirmed ari established line of case-law 
whereby,  in  the  absence  of , measures  to  implement  Article  4 ( 1)  of 
Directive 79/7  "woman are entitled to be treated in the same manner, 
and  to  have  the  same  rules  applied  to  them,  as  men  who  are  in  the 
same  situation"  (40). 
The  legislation  of  Luxembourg  and  the  UK  specifically  require  the 
application  of  the  more  favourable  term  to  the  disfavoured  group. 
However,  where the legislation is silent,  in Germany and Belgium for 
example,  the  courts  have  not  ruled  out  the  non-application  of  the 
benefit for all employees. 
Chapter  3  Pay  for  the  Purposes  of Article  119  of the  EC  Treaty 
Article  119  of  the  EC  Treaty provides  a  broad definition of pay: 
"the  ordinary  basic  or  minimum  wage  or  salary  and  any  other 
consideration,  whether  iu  cash  or  in  kind,  which  the  worker 
receives directly or i'ndirectly,  in respect of his employment  from 
his  employer". 
The  Court  has  repeatedly  held  that  the  concept  of  pay  within  the 
meaning  of  the  second  paragraph  of  Article  119  of  the  EC  Treaty, 
encompasses  all  benefits  in  cash  or  in  kind,  present  or  future, 
provided  they  are  paid,  albeit  indirectly,  by  the  employer  to  the 
worker  in connection with his  employment  (41). 
a)  Basic and additional pay 
Individual  pay  supplements  to  basic  pay  (Danfoss)  (42)  and 
increments based on seniority  (Nimz)  (43)  in addition to basic and 
minimum pay fall within the scope Article  119  of the  EC  Treaty.  It 
would  appear  therefore  that  any  direct  payments  supplementing  a 
basic wage  are  covered. 33 
This  would  appear  to  include  s~ift premia,  overtime  and all  forms 
of merit  and performance  pay.  In  the Botel  (44)  case,  it was  held 
that  time  off with  pay  for  a  part-time  employee  undertaking  Works 
Council  training,  constitued  pay.  Supplements  to  "heads  of 
households"  are included in the concept of pay  (European Commission 
v  Luxembourg)  (45). 
b)  Contractua1  and non-contractua1 pay 
The  fact  that  payments  to  employees  are  not  governed  by  the 
contract of  employment  does  not  remove  them  from  the  scope  of pay 
in Article 119  of the  EC  Treaty.  Gratuities paid at the discretion 
of an  employer  are  encompassed  (Garland)  (46) . 
Thus  pay,  whether  under  a  contract,  statutory  or  collective 
provisions  or  on  a  voluntary basis is  covered.  In  Botel  (47),  the 
Court  held  that  the  payment  of  wages  during  time  out  for  Works 
Council training constituted pay for the purposes of Article 119 of 
the  EC  Treaty and this should be  available to a  part-time employee 
irrespective of whether  the training was  during her normal  working 
hours  or  not. 
Under  the UK's  Equal  Pay Act  1970  as  amended,  claims  for  equal pay 
are  restricted to  elements  of pay which  are contractual.  Where  an 
applicant  seeks  to  claim the benefit of gratuities  this  aspect  of 
her  claim must  be made  under  the  Sex  Discrimination Act  1975.  This 
procedural  complexity  places  an  added  burden  on  an  applicant  to 
identify precisely the  nature of the  remuneration  and  the  correct 
legislation before  her  claim can  succeed. 
c)  Benefit• 
Benefits calculated in monetary terms,  such as  sick pay allowances 
constitute  pay  (Rinner-Kuhn)  (48).  In  addition  the  monetary 
calculation for  time oft to pursue works  council training has  been 
found  to  constitute pay  (Botel)  (49). 34 
d)  Deferred Benefits 
Pensions, .travel facilities obtainable on retirement and severance 
schemes  have  all  been  found  to  constitute  pay  (Garland,  (50),, 
Barber  (51)). 
It appears therefore that all forms  of occupational pens~on schemes 
are covered by Article 119  of the  EC  Treaty.  Only pensions paid by 
the State acting  as  such  are excluded. 
e)  Socia~ Security Benefi  t11  and pay 
In accordance  with Article  119  of  the  EC  Treaty,  "pay"  means  not 
only wages  or salary but also "any other consideration,  whether in 
cash or in kind which the worker receives directly or indirectly in 
respect  of  his  employment  from  his  employer".  It is  important  to 
know  whether  benefits  under  social  security·  schemes  have  to  be 
considered as  pay within  the meaning  of  this Article. 
This question was  referred to the Court for  a  preliminary ruling in 
the Case  80/70  Defrenne  v  the  Belgian State  (52}.  In its judgement. 
of  25  May  1971  in  the  Defrenne  Case  (case  80/70),  the  Court  made 
its  position  clear;  the  Court,  following  the  conclusions  of  the 
Advocate-General,  said that the concept of  the considerations paid 
directly  or  indirectly  in  cash  or  in  kind  could  not  encompass 
schemes  directly  governed  by  legislation  (statutory  schemes) 
without  any  element  of  agreement  within  the  undertaking  or  the 
occupational branch concerned which are compulsorily applicable to 
the  general  category  of  workers.  The  Court  noted  that  for  the 
funding  of 
I 
authorities 
such  schemes  workers,  employers  and  the  public 
contribute  in  a  measure  determined  less  by  the 
employment  relationship  than  by  considerations  of  social policy. 
For  these  reasons,  the  Court  concluded  that  "any  other, 
consideration"  could not  be  regarded  as  encompassing  the benefits 
from statutory social security schemes. 35 
On  the  other  hand,  however,  this  line  of  reasoning,  as  the 
Commission  deduced  inunediately,  means  that  company  schemes  are 
included by virtue of the fact  that they are not directly governed 
by  legislation.  They  involve  an  element  of  agreement  within  the 
undertaking  or  the  branch,  they  are  not  compulsory  for  general 
categories of workers but  for  the categories in the undertaking or 
the branch and are  financed by  employers or workers  who  contribute 
directly,  depending  on  the  funding  needs  of the schemes  and not  on 
considerations  of  a  social policy.  This  approach  was  confirmed in 
1986. 
The Court ruled in Case 170/84 Bilka-Kaufhaus v  Weber  (53)  that the 
exclusion of part-time workers  from the benefits of an occupational 
pension  financed  solely by  the  employer  was  prohibited by Article 
119  of  the  EC  Treaty  where  it  could  be  established  that  such  a 
measure  would mainly affect  female  workers  unless  the undertaking 
showed  that  the  exclusion  was  based  on  objectively  justified 
factors  unrelated  to  any  discrimination  on  ground of sex. 
It should be  borne in mind  that the Court's  judgement in the  Bilka 
case  (see  above)  came  at  a  moment  when  negotiations  within  the 
Council  on  the  adoption  of  Directive  86/378/EEC  relating  to  the 
equality  of  treatment  between  men  and  women  in  the  field  of 
occupational  schemes  had  been  terminated  'and  that,  when  it  was 
adopted,  the Commission placed on record its reservations as  to the 
conformity of  some provisions of the Directive with the Article 119 
of the  EC  Treaty as the Court had just interpreted it in this case. 
With  its  judgement  of  17  May  1990  (54),  the  Court  confirms  the 
Conunission' s  original interpret_ation and the decision in the Bilka 
case and no longer leaves any  room for doubt;  social benefits under 
the terms  of an occupational  scheme  fall within the concept of pay 
within  the meaning  of Article  119  of  the  EC  Treaty. f) 
36 
Pay and other Working Conditions 
Increasingly,  the  Court  blurs  the  distinction  between  "pay"  and' 
access  to  benefits.  In  a  number  of  cases,· it has  found  that  the 
exclusion from a  benefit because of age or hours of work thresholds· 
falls  under "pay"  for the purposes of Article 119 of the EC  Treaty 
and  not  under  the  provisions  of  the  Equal  Treatment  Directive 
(Defrenne III  (55),  Kowalska  (55),  Bilka  (57)  and Nimz  (58)). 
g)  Total  Pay  Package  v  Identifiable  terms 
In Barber  (59),  the Court considered of  fundamental  importance the 
concept of "transparency" in relation to "pay"  under Article 119 of 
the  EC  Treaty. 
It decided: 
·"if  the  national  courts  were  under  an  obligation  to  make  an 
assessment  and  a  comparison  of  all  the  various  types  of 
consideration  granted  to  men  and  women,  judical  review  would  be 
difficult  and  the  effectiveness  of  Article  119  of  the  EC  Treaty 
would  be  diminished  as  a  result.  Il  follows  that  ~enuine genuine 
transparency,  permitting an effective review is assured only if the 
principle  of  equal  pay  applies  to  each  of  the  elements  of 
remuneration granted to  men  or  women  (60). 
The  Court  ruled that: 
"the application of the principle of  equal  pay  must  be  ensured in 
respect of each  element of  remuneration  and  not  only  on  the basis 
of  comprehensive  assessment  of  the  consideration  paid  to  workers 
(61)". 37 
Thus,  arguments  which  maintain  that it is  the total package  of pay 
and benefits between women  and men  undertaking equal work which must 
be  identical,  appear unacceptable. 
However,  in  Ireland  and  Belgium,  the  courts  have  held  that  the 
relevant  comparison  for  determining equal pay is the  total package 
of benefits and not the identifiable unfavourable benefit  (Belgium-
Labour  Court  of  Antwerp  - 27.3.84  - and  Ireland  - Labour  Court 
Lissadell  Towels  v  56  women).  This  would  appear  to  be  contrary  to 
European  law. 
The  full implications of a  complete implementation of Article 119 of 
the  EC  Treaty  and  the  Equal  Pay  Directive  mean  that  where  work  is 
found  to  be  of  equal  value,  the  favourable  elements  of  terms  and 
conditions  apply  equally to the  female  and male  jobs. 38 
PART  III:  THE  NEED  FOR  FURTHER  MEASURES  TO  PR<»!!TE  THE  PRACTICAL 
ACHIEVEMENT  OF  EQUAL  PAY  FOR  WORK  OF  EQUAL  VALUE 
* 
Whilst all Member  States have incorporated the fundamental principle 
of equal pay into their national legislation and the  judgement given 
by  the  European  Court  of  Justice  in  the  Barber  case  ( 62)  has 
considerably  clarified the  scope  of Article  119  of  the  EC  Treaty, 
there has  been little effective progress  on  achieving the principle 
of  equal  pay  in practice. 
It  is  imperative  that  the  fundamental  right  to  equal  pay  under 
Article 119 of the  EC  Treaty as amplified by Directive 75/117/EEC is 
fully implemented at Community level.  This is especially important, 
in  view of the fact that the Maastricht Treaty *  has  reiterated the 
Community's  commitment  to this principle. 
The  Commission believes that,  in addition to  the purely legislative 
aspects,  any strategy to  promote  the practical achievement  of  equal 
pay for work of equal value has to  incorporate other features,  which 
can  be  articulated around  some  key  ideas  : 
It should be  noted that  Protocol  no.  14  of  the Treaty  on.European  Union  on 
social  policy  and  the  annexed  Agreement  on  social  policy  concluded  by  the 
Member  States  of  the  European  Community  with  the  exception  of  the  United 
Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland  contains  in Article  6  (3) 
thereof  an additional  element  in relation to equal  pay.  It provides  that  : 
"This  Article  shall  not  prevent  any  Memb~r State  from  maintaining  or 
adopting  measures  providing  for  specific  advantages  in  order  to  make  it 
easier for women to pursue. a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate 
for disadvantages  in their professional  careers." 
It  might  also  be  noted  that  the  Protocol  and  the  said  Agreement 
are  without  prejudice  to  the provisions  of  the  Treaty,  "particularly those 
relating  to  social  policy  which  constitute  an  integral  part  of  the  acquis' 
communautaire" . 39 
1.  Improvement  of baseline data  on  women  and pay 
The  need  for  adequate data for accurate wage  comparisons  between 
men  and women  across broad sectors and occupations throughout the 
Community  has  never  been  greater.  There  is  an  increasing  demand 
for  up-to-date gender-specific data. 
The  Commission  therefore calls  on  Member  States to undertake  and 
improve the systematic collection of  essential data on gender pay 
and occupational segregation to identify  wage discrimination.  In 
appropriate  cases,  the  Commission  is  prepared  to  contribute  to 
such an action,  either financially or by means  of the Statistical 
Office  of  the  European  Communities  (EUROSTAT)  . 
2.  ,Improved dissemination of information 
The  Commission  would  encourage  the  organisation  of  research, 
seminars and conferences on the characteristics of payment systems 
and their impact  on  the  gap  between  men's  and  women's  earnings. 
Lack  of  awareness  of  significant cases  based  on  Community  law is 
a  major  disadvantage  in progressing  equality  issues.  Therefore, 
the  Commission  ,  in association with  the Member  States,  will try 
to  improve  the dissemination of  information on  significant cases 
based  on  Community  law,  to ensure that these developments  can  be 
taken·into account  in national  litigation. 
3.  Training 
The  Commission  would  encourage  the  organisation  of  further 
practical  and  legal  traininq  at  both  Community  level.  and 
throughout  the  Member  States  on  the  implementation  of  equal  pay 
in  order  to  improve  the  knowledge  of  the  legal  provisions  and 
practical  ways  of  addressing  equal  pay. 40 
4.  Legal  action 
The Commission will continue to have recourse to proceedings under 
Article  169  of  the Treaty where  this is considered appropriate. 
Green  Paper  on  European  Social  Policy  Options  for  the  Union  (63) 
Further  action  which  might  be  taken  at  Community  level  will  be 
considered  in  the  context  of  the  Green  Paper  on  the  future 
Europe~n Social  Policy presented by  the Commission. 
Among the options which the Commission considers warrant attention 
is the possibility of adoption of certain basic principles which 
could  serve  as  guidelines  for  joint  negotiations  on  job 
classification  and  job  evaluation  at  various  levels,  without 
prejudice to the  autonomy  and  individual  responsabilities  of  the 
social partners. 
Some  of  these  guidelines  could  be  used  as  a  basis  for  a  Code  of 
.Practice  on  the  implementation  of  equal  pay  for  work  of  equal 
value.  The  idea of  Code  of  Practice with  regard to  the  treatment 
of  weaker  groups  of  workers  has  already  been  floated  in  the 
Opinion  on  an  Equitable  Wage  adopted  by  the  Commisssion  on  1 
September  1993  (64). 
A  code  of. practice on  equal  pay might  include,  for  example 
·publicising in the workplace the right to equal  pay  for  work 
of equal  value. 
how  to  monitor  the  workplace  by  gender,  occupation  and  pay 
and  benefits  in  the  light  of  European  and  national 
obligations. 
how  to  analyse  monitoring  information  to  determine  the 
existence  and  extent of  wage  discrimination. 41 
explaining  the  types  of  strategies  that  can  be  adopted  to 
address  wage  discrimination,  eg.  revision  of  flat  rate pay, 
integrating  grades  and  categories  of  gender  segregated 
workers,  developing  non-discriminatory  job  evaluation 
schemes,  redefining educational qualifications,  reorganising 
work. 
providing  guidance  on  developing  non-discriminatory  job 
evaluation  schemes:- making  visible  and  capturing  female 
work,  analysing  factors,  levels  and  weighting  to  exclude 
discrimination,  administration,  implementation  and 
maintenance  of  schemes. 
how  to develop  a  strategy for  addressing wage  discrimination 
appropriate  to  the  organisation. 
how  to implement the strategy to address wage discrimination, 
eg,  the role of average paylines,  modifying pay systems,  red-
circling. 
It is envisaged  that  such  a  Code  would  be  directed primarily at 
the  social  partners  in  order  to  raise  awareness,  to  provide  a 
training  resources  and  to  develop  confidence  to  address  this 
complex  issue  in  the  context  of  collective bargaining. 
In  this  context,  it  is  clear  that  one  of  the  most  innovative 
features  of  the  Social  Protocol  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  is  the 
increased  participation  of  the  social  partners  both  in  the 
formulation  and  implementation  of  Community  legislation  which 
offers  new  possibilities in the  field of  equal  pay. 42 
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